credo@lemmy.world to News@lemmy.world · 5 days agoBiden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missileswww.nytimes.comexternal-linkmessage-square118fedilinkarrow-up1586arrow-down111cross-posted to: world@lemmy.world
arrow-up1575arrow-down1external-linkBiden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missileswww.nytimes.comcredo@lemmy.world to News@lemmy.world · 5 days agomessage-square118fedilinkcross-posted to: world@lemmy.world
minus-squareDarkFuture@lemmy.worldlinkfedilinkEnglisharrow-up1·2 days ago Democracy doesn’t work. Do you grasp that this is an opinion? Because you keep stating it like it’s fact.
minus-squareBabalugats@lemmy.worldlinkfedilinkarrow-up1arrow-down1·2 days agoIt is fact. Look up arrows impossibility theorem.
minus-squareDarkFuture@lemmy.worldlinkfedilinkEnglisharrow-up1·1 day agoIf you read into it at all, you didn’t read far enough. As shown above, the proof of Arrow’s theorem relies crucially on the assumption of ranked voting. The language of Arrow’s theorem can be misunderstood. It does not mean that democracy is doomed to failure and that only dictators are sound political institutions. Arrow’s theorem states that there is no procedure to decide among three or more candidates that satisfies the above properties. If the axioms are an ideal that cannot be met, then other, less stringent, criteria should be used to compare and evaluate election procedures. Or, as may be the case, the selection of an election procedure is a decision about which of the above axioms is less important to the application at hand.
Do you grasp that this is an opinion? Because you keep stating it like it’s fact.
It is fact. Look up arrows impossibility theorem.
If you read into it at all, you didn’t read far enough.
As shown above, the proof of Arrow’s theorem relies crucially on the assumption of ranked voting.
The language of Arrow’s theorem can be misunderstood. It does not mean that democracy is doomed to failure and that only dictators are sound political institutions. Arrow’s theorem states that there is no procedure to decide among three or more candidates that satisfies the above properties. If the axioms are an ideal that cannot be met, then other, less stringent, criteria should be used to compare and evaluate election procedures. Or, as may be the case, the selection of an election procedure is a decision about which of the above axioms is less important to the application at hand.