I’m not the guy you’re arguing with, but it will be interesting to see if/how LLMs deal with novel Gödel sentences in a way that is more than just mimicry. I’m sure there is a way to set this up that is mathematically rigourous.
The idea is that there are some statements which are true but unprovable in a formal system. Since LLMs run on a computer they are technically a formal system of sorts. So it will be interesting to see if they can pinpoint the true yet unprovable sentences. If they can it will lead to a lot of interesting questions about how exactly they know it’s true without “proving” it in some roundabout way.
I’m not doing this issue justice. A lot has been written on this by Roger Penrose (you don’t have to agree with his stance to appreciate that he’s touching on an interesting problem, here).
I’m not the guy you’re arguing with, but it will be interesting to see if/how LLMs deal with novel Gödel sentences in a way that is more than just mimicry. I’m sure there is a way to set this up that is mathematically rigourous.
The idea is that there are some statements which are true but unprovable in a formal system. Since LLMs run on a computer they are technically a formal system of sorts. So it will be interesting to see if they can pinpoint the true yet unprovable sentences. If they can it will lead to a lot of interesting questions about how exactly they know it’s true without “proving” it in some roundabout way.
I’m not doing this issue justice. A lot has been written on this by Roger Penrose (you don’t have to agree with his stance to appreciate that he’s touching on an interesting problem, here).